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Abstract This paper analyses the impact of random failure or attack on the
public transit networks of London and Paris in a comparative study. In par-
ticular we analyze how the dysfunction or removal of sets of stations or links
(rails, roads, etc.) affects the connectivity properties within these networks.
We show how accumulating dysfunction leads to emergent phenomena that
cause the transportation system to break down as a whole. Simulating differ-
ent directed attack strategies, we find minimal strategies with high impact and
identify a-priory criteria that correlate with the resilience of these networks.
To demonstrate our approach, we choose the London and Paris public transit
networks. Our quantitative analysis is performed in the frames of the com-
plex network theory – a methodological tool that has emerged recently as an
interdisciplinary approach joining methods and concepts of the theory of ran-
dom graphs, percolation, and statistical physics. In conclusion we demonstrate
that taking into account cascading effects the network integrity is controlled
for both networks by less than 0.5% of the stations i.e. 19 for Paris and 34 for
London.
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1 Introduction
”The traveller fared slowly on his way, who fared towards Paris from Eng-
land in the autumn of the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-two.
More than enough of bad roads, bad equipages, and bad horses, he would have
encountered to delay him”.1 In the times when Charles Dickens wrote these
words in his famous novel, there was perhaps not too much difference con-
cerning the quality of transportation systems in the two cities, or reasons that
may have caused their malfunction. Historical circumstances may have had a
different impact on the development of public transit security in both cities.
However, today one might assume that on average the differences observed be-
tween the facilities offered by transportation networks of developed countries
may be small enough. Analyzing the readily available data on these networks
both with algorithms and analytical approaches we test this assumption and
quantify remaining differences.
The aim of this paper is to compare security features of highly developed
contemporary public transit networks (PTN) - of two European capitals, Lon-
don and Paris. These cities were chosen as they display similarities in their
structure and historical development caused by geographical and social rea-
sons and further due to the particular role of the public transit facilities of
London in the wake of the 2012 Olympics. We will be interested in the impact
of both random failure and targeted attacks that may lead to dysfunction ei-
ther within the stations of the PTN or along the links (rails, roads, bridges,
etc.) that connect them. In a general approach to this problem one would want
to consider a dynamic model of the PTN including the current local capacities
and loads at the time of failure, detailed passenger destinations and itinerary
together with a full view of the PTN structure (i.e. topological and connec-
tivity properties of the network). In lack of availability of corresponding data
for such an approach we restrict our study to the impact of failure on the
topological and connectivity properties of the analyzed networks. This pro-
vides a first but essential step towards understanding how vulnerabilities may
be reduced by choosing appropriate network topologies. In particular, we will
consider the static network structure of the PTNs of London and Paris and
analyze their vulnerability with respect to dysfunction due to random failure
or directed attack. As we will see below, simulating various failure and attack
scenarios even on this level illuminates significant differences and allows for
general conclusions concerning the behavior of these PTNs under stress.
The setup of this paper is as follows. In the next section we briefly describe
the general method of our analysis – complex network theory [1,2] – and
present an overview on previous studies. We proceed to discuss the problem
of PTN vulnerability in section 3, where we show how this problem is related
to the percolation theory [3]. We introduce observables that quantitatively
measure the impact on PTNs under attack, a problem we further analyze in
section 4 where we present a comparative analysis of the London and Paris
1 Charles Dickens. A Tale of Two Cities. London: Penguin Classics (2003).
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PTNs and the impact of failure and attacks of different nature. We discuss
possible reasons for the differences observed for PTN vulnerability and propose
estimators for local and global properties that allow a priory assessment of the
degree of resilience or vulnerability of PTNs. Taking into account cascading
effects in the interplay between routes and stations we demonstrate in section
5 that the network integrity hinges on the effective operation of a very small
set of important stations.
2 A complex network model of public transit
The observation that the paths of public transit routes of a city form a network
and that this network is complex enough is part of our everyday experience.
However, the concept of complex networks has recently become the nucleus of
a new and rapidly developing field of knowledge that has its roots in random
graph theory and statistical physics (see e.g. recent reviews [1] and mono-
graphs [2]). From a mathematical point of view, a network is nothing else but
a graph defined by a set of vertexes and a set of edges or links each connecting
a pair of vertexes. Graph theory is well-settled branch of discrete mathemat-
ics with origins in classical works of L. Euler [4]. An essential breakthrough
and a paradigm shift in graph theory (and in particular concerning random
graphs) occurred in the 1990-ies, when particular correlations were discovered
in otherwise seemingly random graphs. It was realized, that numerous natural
and man-made structures may be described in terms of networks and that
these networks posses surprising properties, strikingly different from those of
the so-called classical random graph [5]. Such networks are currently classi-
fied as complex networks. To name a few, these include networks describing
interacting systems of biological, ecological, sociological or technological ori-
gins such as networks of cell metabolism, communication, transportation, and
many other forms of interaction. Complex networks have been found to be com-
pact structures (sometimes called small worlds) with short distances between
nodes, and a high level of correlation and self-organization. They demonstrate
extremely high resilience with respect to random failure. However they are
proven to be particularly vulnerable with respect to targeted attacks. Some of
their statistical properties, in particular the distribution of node degrees (the
number of connections of individual nodes) are governed by power laws. This
indicates the presence of non-trivial correlations within the structure of these
systems. We set out to show that similar properties are inherent to the PTN
of London and Paris studied in the present work.
Recent research [6,7,8,9,10,11,12] on public transit networks has produced
quantitative evidence that PTNs share general features of other transportation
or transmission networks like airport, railway, or power grid networks [1]. These
features include evolutionary growth, optimization, and usually an embedding
in two dimensional (2D) space. Earlier empirical studies of PTNs in the frames
of complex network theory have often restricted the analysis to certain sub-
networks of city transit. Examples are studies of subway networks of Boston
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Table 1 Characteristics of the PTNs analyzed in this study. N : number of stations; R:
number of routes. Given characteristics are: 〈k〉 (mean node degree); `max, 〈`〉 (maximal
and mean shortest path length); C (relation of the mean clustering coefficient to that of the
classical random graph of equal size, (3) ); CB : betweenness centrality (5); κ(z), κ(k) (c.f.
Eqs. (11), (9)); degree distribution exponent γ (4). Additional details may be found in [11].
City N R 〈k〉 `max 〈`〉 C CB κ(z) κ(k) γ
London 10937 922 2.60 107 26.5 320.6 1.4·105 1.87 3.22 4.48
Paris 3728 251 3.73 28 6.4 78.5 1.0·104 5.32 6.93 2.62
[6,7], Vienna [7] and several other cities [8], and city bus networks in Poland
[9] and China [10]. However, as far as the bus-, subway- or tram-subnetworks
are not closed systems the inclusion of additional subnetworks has significant
impact on the overall network properties as has been shown for the subway and
bus networks of Boston [6]. Therefore, further analysis of PTN has included
the full set of subnetworks [11].
The two PTNs analyzed within the present work are either operated by a
single operator (Traffic for London, TFL) or by small number of operators with
a coordinated schedule (three operators for Paris), as expressed by a central
web site from which our data was obtained.2 The analyzed PTN of London
covers the metropolitan area of ’Greater London’ and includes buses, subway,
and tram. Correspondingly, the PTN of Paris as analyzed here covers the
metropolitan area ’aire urbaine’ and comprises buses, RER and subway. Some
characteristics of these networks are given in Table 1. There is a number of
different ways to represent a PTN in the form of a graph [6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13].
In what follows below, we will mostly use the so-called L-space representation
[6,9,11], where each public transit station is represented by a vertex (node) and
any two stations serviced successively by at least one route are connected by
an edge (link). In this representation the obtained graph – a complex network
– is most similar to the PTN map.3 Typical measures for the ’diameter’ of the
network are the maximal or the mean shortest path lengths `max and 〈`〉. The
latter is defined by:
〈`〉 = 2
N(N − 1)
∑
i>j∈N
`(i, j), (1)
where N is the number of network nodes, `(i, j) is the length of a shortest path
(in terms of station intervals traveled) between nodes i and j and the sum
spans all pairs i, j of sites that belong to the network N . The comparatively
low values of 〈`〉 found for the two PTNs (see Table 1) may be related to their
small world structure (where 〈`〉 shows logarithmic growth with the number of
nodes) [11]. The fact that the London PTN has a larger value `max corresponds
to the larger area covered by the network (as seen, e.g. from larger number of
routes and stations).
2 See [11] for more details on the database.
3 Note, however that multiple links are absent in this graph.
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The mean and maximal shortest path lengths characterize the network as
a whole and sometimes are referred to as global properties of the network.
An example of a local property is given by the node degree ki, the number of
links that are connected to the node i. By definition, it is equal to the number
of nodes adjacent to the given one and defines the neighborhood size of this
node. Obviously, not all neighbors of the node i need to be neighbors of each
other. This property is measured by the clustering coefficient:
Ci =
2yi
ki(ki − 1) , ki ≥ 2, (2)
where yi is the number of links between the neighbors of node i and Ci = 0 for
ki = 0, 1. In general, clustering reflects a specific form of correlation present in
a network: the clustering coefficient of a node may also be interpreted as the
probability of any two of its neighbors to be connected. A useful numerical
indicator is given by the ratio of the mean clustering coefficient of a network to
the corresponding value for the classical Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph of equal
size:
C = 〈Ci〉/CER. (3)
Here, CER = 2M/N
2 where the classical Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph is con-
structed by randomly linking N nodes by M links [1,2]. Therefore, the high
values of C found in Table 1 for London and Paris indicate strong local cor-
relations in these networks. Moreover, the London PTN appears locally to be
stronger correlated than that of Paris.
Another striking difference between the properties of random graphs and
the PTNs considered here is the behavior of the node-degree distribution P (k),
the probability that an arbitrary node is of degree k. The random graph is
characterized by a Poisson distribution which decays exponentially for large k
[1,2]. The empirically observed distributions for the London and Paris PTNs
however show a decay best described by a power law [11] :
P (k) ∼ k−γ , k  1. (4)
The power law decay (4) indicates scale-free properties of the London and
Paris PTNs. It is instructive to note that the exponent γ governing this decay
is much smaller for the PTN of Paris, see Table 1. As we will show this has
important impact on the observed resilience of the network.
To some extent, the node degree may be considered as a local measure of
the importance of the node: it is intuitively reasonable that hubs (nodes with a
high degree) play an essential role in networks. The importance of a node with
respect to the connectivity between other nodes of the network, however, is
more efficiently measured by the so-called betweenness centrality. For a given
node i, the latter measures the overall share of shortest paths between pairs
of other nodes that pass through this node. The betweenness of node i may
be calculated as:
CB(i) =
∑
j 6=i6=k∈N
σjk(i)
σjk
(5)
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where σjk is the number of shortest paths between nodes j and k of the network
N and σjk(i) is the number of these paths that go via node i. Numerical values
of the mean betweenness are given in Table 1 for both PTNs.
3 PTN resilience: observables and attack scenarios
The impact on complex network behavior upon removal of either their nodes or
links is closely related to so-called lattice percolation phenomena [3]. The lat-
ter occurs on homogeneous structures (lattices) whereas the non-homogeneity
of complex networks gives rise to a variety of phenomena specific for these
structures. The empirical analysis of scale-free real-world networks has shown
that these networks display unexpectedly high degrees of robustness under
random failure [1,2]. However they may be particularly vulnerable to attacks,
that target important nodes or links. As we have seen in the previous section,
both the London and the Paris PTN share common features of complex net-
works. Therefore, we may expect their behavior under stress or attack to be
similar.
The first property a transit network trivially needs to fulfil is overall con-
nectivity: there must be a path within the network between any two nodes.
Upon failure of a smaller or larger set of nodes this overall connectivity may get
lost. Generally one considers a network to remain functional if a significantly
large connected component (sometimes called a spanning cluster) remains con-
nected.
The phenomenon of the appearance and nature of such spanning clusters
is at the center of a well established field of Statistical Physics: percolation
theory [3]. Originally it describes the emergence of such spanning clusters on
a lattice at a certain threshold for the concentration cperc of links or nodes
present on the lattice and predicts universal properties that may be observed
and calculated within the theory with high precision.
On a lattice, the appearance of a spanning cluster signals the onset of
percolation at a particular concentration cperc of lattice occupation. In turn,
the probability that an arbitrary chosen lattice site belongs to the spanning
cluster is naturally used as an order parameter: it is equal one for c = 1, zero
for c < cperc and follows universal behavior as c approaches cperc from above.
A similar percolation phenomenon occurs when a giant connected component
emerges on an idealized complex network. The giant connected component is
understood as a connected subnetwork which in the limit of an infinite network
contains a finite fraction of the network. As far as real world networks are
finite, the giant component is not well defined. Instead we will observe the
size N1(c) of the largest connected component in the network to monitor the
behavior of the network as function of the share c of nodes or links that are
removed in sequence. For convenience we define the relative size (or share) of
the largest component as the ratio of N1(c) to N , the number of nodes in the
initial unperturbed network:
S(c) = N1(c)/N. (6)
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Fig. 1 Share of the largest component S (a), mean inverse 〈`−1〉 (b) and maximal `max
(c) shortest path length as function of the removed share c of nodes for the PTN of London
(light green curve) and Paris (dark red curve). Random removal of PTN nodes.
Another variable that may be used to monitor changes in network structure
as nodes or links are removed is the mean inverse shortest path length [14]:
〈`−1〉 = 2
N(N − 1)
∑
i>j∈N
`−1(i, j). (7)
Here, as in (1), `(i, j) is the shortest path between nodes i and j that belong to
the network N . Note however, that while (1) is ill-defined for the disconnected
network, the quantity (7) is well-defined as far as `−1(i, j) = 0 if nodes i, j are
disconnected. It may therefore be used to trace impact on the network under
attack.
In Figs. 1 a, b we show the behavior of S and 〈`−1〉 for the PTN of London
and Paris as function of the share of removed nodes c, as these are removed
at random. Already this simple random approach to probe the PTN behavior
under attack shows a higher vulnerability of the London PTN to random
removal of its nodes: both the S- and 〈`−1〉-curves indicate a faster decay in the
case of London PTN. Moreover, the S-curve for the Paris PTN decays almost
linearly. This indicates that sub-clusters less connected to the overall network
are almost absent. The size of the largest component decreases only due to the
removed nodes. This observation will be further quantified in the next section.
Here, we want to support it by displaying the maximal shortest path length
behavior, Fig. 1 c. As a matter of fact, `max manifests very different behavior
for these two PTN. For the London PTN, `max grows initially and then, when
a certain threshold is reached (c ∼ 0.14) it abruptly decreases. Obviously,
removing the nodes initially increases the path lengths as deviations from the
original shortest paths need to be taken into account. At some point, removing
further nodes then leads to a breakup of the network into smaller components
on which the paths are naturally limited which explains the sudden decrease
of their lengths. Such peculiarities in the behavior of `max are almost absent
for the Paris PTN, at least for small and medium values of c.
Note, that the plots of Fig. 1 display the results of a single random se-
quence of node removal. However, as we have checked statistics over large
number of random attack sequences [13,15], the large PTN size leads to a
’self-averaging’ effect: averaging over many random attack sequences gives re-
sults almost identical to those presented in Fig. 1. To further analyze the PTN
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attack vulnerability, we have made a series of computer simulations removing
PTN nodes and links not at random, but ordering them according to their
importance with respect to network connectivity, scenarios we call attack or
directed attack. To order these we use the already mentioned properties such as
node degree, betweenness centrality (5), clustering coefficient (2) and several
other indicators (see [13,15]). Another attack scenario that has proven success-
ful in immunization problems on complex networks [17] consists in removing
of a randomly chosen neighbor of a randomly chosen node. Its efficiency is
based on the fact, that in this way nodes with a high number of neighbors
will be selected with higher probability. Each of the above described scenarios
(except for the random ones) was realized for the lists prepared for the initial
network or lists rebuilt by recalculating the order of the remaining nodes after
each step. The latter way is known to be usually more efficient and leads to
slightly different results suggesting that the network structure changes in the
course of the attack [14,18].
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k [P]
k [L]
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Fig. 2 Relative size S of the largest component of the London and Paris PTNs as function
of the share c of removed nodes either chosen at random, or ordered by decreasing node
degree k or betweenness CB centrality. The lists were rebuilt by recalculating the order of
the remaining nodes after each step. RV (RN): random removal of a node (or of its randomly
chosen neighbor). A letter in square brackets refers to the London [L] or Paris [P] PTN.
In Fig. 2 we show the relative size of the largest component of London and
Paris PTN as function of the share of nodes removed following specific attack
scenarios described above. More specifically, nodes were removed in chunks of
1 % of the initial nodes and a recalculation took place after the removal of
each 1% chunk of nodes. As may be drawn from a first glance of the plots, the
most harmful are attacks targeted on the nodes of highest node degree and
highest betweenness. We will discuss these in more detail in the next section,
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complementing the picture of node-targeted attacks by that of attacks that
target PTN links.
4 PTN vulnerability: quantitative analysis
In what follows we discuss in some detail those attacks that have highest im-
pact on the two PTNs and compare these with the random attack scenario.
To this end, we introduce indicators that quantify PTN resilience [19,20].
Furthermore, we seek correlations between PTN resilience and network char-
acteristics that may be measured independently. We apply this scheme to both
node-targeted attacks (section 4.1) and link-targeted attacks (section 4.2).
4.1 Node-targeted attacks
As clearly seen from Figs. 2, if nodes are removed ordered by decreasing degree
or betweenness centrality the size S of the largest component decreases fast
and S is near zero at a share of removed nodes c ∼ 0.2 ÷ 0.3. In Fig. 3 we
further detail this picture giving plots for the size of the largest component S,
mean inverse 〈`−1〉 and maximal `max shortest path lengths as function of the
removed node share c for the highest node degree (figures a – c) and the highest
betweenness centrality (figures d – f) scenarios. Let us compare these with the
corresponding plots of Fig. 1, where the impact of random node removal is
shown. We observe that for these directed attack scenarios the behavior of
both PTNs is not as different as it was observed for the random scenario.
Although for the highest node degree scenario both S(c) and 〈`−1(c)〉 curves
manifest a faster decay for the London PTN (see Figs. 3 a, b), the difference
is less pronounced in the case of the highest betweenness centrality scenario
(Figs. 3 d, e). The similarity in the performance of both PTNs with respect
to such attacks is also obvious in the behavior of the maximal shortest path
length `max. For both London and Paris PTNs one observes a pronounced
peak in `max(c) at c ∼ 0.06 and c ∼ 0.1 with further, smaller peaks occurring
with irregular periodicity indicating the existence of sub-clusters within both
networks.
The above comparison of the PTN attack vulnerability is as it stands
mostly qualitative. To proceed further with a quantitative analysis, a numer-
ical measure of resilience needs to be defined. In percolation theory, where a
spanning cluster occurs abruptly at a given percolation concentration cperc,
the latter may be used as such a measure. In the case of real-world networks
of finite size one rather observes a region of concentrations where the emergent
behavior of fast decay occurs. In some studies a characteristic concentration
value based on particular behavior of either S, 〈`〉, 〈`−1〉 or `max has been
used to identify network breakdown [14,15]. Here, we focus on the behavior of
the largest component of the PTN and follow Ref. [19] to introduce a measure
that integrates the network reaction over the whole attack sequence. If S(c) is
10 Christian von Ferber et al.
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Fig. 3 Share of the largest component S, mean inverse 〈`−1〉 and maximal `max shortest
path length as function of the removed nodes share c for PTN of London (light green curve)
and Paris (dark red curve). a, b, c: highest node degree scenario. d, e, f: highest betweenness
centrality scenario.
the normalized size of the largest component as function of concentration c,
we calculate the area A below the S(c) curve as:
A = 100
∫ 1
0
S(c)dc, (8)
and use this as a measure of network resilience. As follows from the definition
(8), the measure captures the effects on the network over the complete attack
sequence and it is a characteristic measure, well-defined for finite-size networks.
The larger the measure A, the more resilient is the network.
In the left part of table 2 we give the resilience A for the highest node degree
and highest betweenness scenarios and compare with the random scenario. As
follows from the table, in almost all instances the Paris PTN shows higher
resilience A than the London PTN. Another conclusion concerns the difference
between the value of A for the random attack (RV) and for attacks that target
specific important nodes (with high degree k or high betweenness centrality
CB): as often observed for complex networks, they are robust with respect
to random removal of nodes or links but especially vulnerable to targeted
attacks. Naturally the question arises whether such result may be anticipated
a priory: can one derive some criteria for PTN resilience prior to the attack?
Indeed, the data of Table 1 where information about initial PTN characteristics
is summarized allows to at least qualitatively prognosticate the outcome of
attacks as summarized in Table 2. For an explanation, let us shortly recall
several facts drawn from complex network theory.
For uncorrelated infinite random networks it has been shown [21,22], that
a giant connected component is present if the following ratio of moments of
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Table 2 Resilience measure A, (8), for the PTNs of London and Paris. Columns 2-4 give
the value of A for node-targeted attacks, columns 5-7 give A for link-targeted attacks. See
the text for attack scenario descriptions.
City Node-targeted attacks Link-targeted attacks
RV k CB RL k(l) C(l)B
London 29.31 5.45 8.71 27.45 20.95 27.2
Paris 37.93 10.77 10.67 56.04 47.12 55.93
the degree distribution
κ(k) = 〈k2〉/〈k〉, (9)
is greater than two,
κ(k) ≥ 2. (10)
Relation (10) is often referred to as the Molloy-Reed criterion and κ(k) is called
the Molloy-Reed parameter.
It has been illustrated for many real-world PTN [13,15,20], that the value
of the Molloy-Reed parameter for the unperturbed network may be used to
estimate network resilience against attack. Typically, networks with low κ(k)
appear to be more vulnerable to both random and node degree-targeted at-
tacks. This observation is further supported by monitoring other related pa-
rameters, such as the ratio of the mean number z2 of second neighbors to the
mean number z1 of neighbors:
4
κ(z) = z2/z1. (11)
It is easy show that κ(k) = κ(z) + 1 for uncorrelated networks. As we have
seen from the analysis of section 2, strong correlations are present in the PTN
and one may not expect a simple relation between parameters κ(k) and κ(z)
to hold. However, a comparison of κ(z) for two given networks will provide
additional information about their relative resilience.
We have calculated values of κ(k) and κ(z) for the London and Paris PTNs
and give them in the ninth and tenth columns of table 1. The corresponding
values for the Paris PTN exceed those for London by a factor of two giving a
clear signal for a higher vulnerability of the London PTN to random failure.
This conclusion has been empirically demonstrated in our simulations reported
above.
The higher potential for resilient behavior of the Paris PTN with respect
to that of London may also be related to its node-degree distribution. In the
last column of table 1 we list the exponent γ, that controls the decay of this
distribution. The smaller value of γ for Paris PTN corresponds to the fat-tailed
node-degree distribution P (k). For an infinite network, the giant connected
component is always present for the random attack scenario as long as γ < 3
[22] and a smaller values of γ indicate higher network resilience.
4 By definition z1 is equal to the mean node degree 〈k〉.
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Our analysis has so far described attacks on the network nodes. Before pass-
ing to general conclusions, let us further analyze the impact of link-targeted
attacks on the two PTNs.
4.2 Link-targeted attacks
Considering link-targeted attacks we concentrate here on those scenarios that
have proven to be most harmful for node-targeted variants, namely removing
links with highest degree and highest betweenness centrality. Our aim is to
check how resilient the two PTNs are to attacks on links following the corre-
sponding scenarios. However, to proceed we need to generalize the notions of
degree and betweenness for the case of links. We define the degree k(l) of the
link between nodes i and j with degrees ki and kj as [13,20]:
k
(l)
ij = ki + kj − 2. (12)
With this definition, the link degree is k(l) = 0 for a graph with two vertices
and a single link, while for any link in a connected graph with more than two
vertices the link degree will be at least one, k(l) ≥ 1. The generalization of
betweenness centrality for a link e is straightforward:
C(l)B (e) =
∑
s 6=t∈N
σst(e)
σst
, (13)
where σst is the number of shortest paths between the two nodes s, t ∈ N ,
that belong to the network N , and σst(e) is the number of shortest paths
between nodes s and t that go through the link e (c.f. formula (5) for the node
betweenness centrality). By definition, C(l)B (e) measures the importance of a
link e with respect to the connectivity between the nodes of the network.
Fig. 4 shows the results of our simulations for three different attack sce-
narios, where the PTN links are removed at random (RL) or according to lists
ordered by decreasing link degrees and link betweenness centrality. As in the
case of node-targeted attacks these lists were recalculated after each step of
1% of link removal. The figure shows the relative size of the largest component
of the PTN as function of the share of removed links. Let us first note that
the removal of a link does not necessarily lead to a decrease in S. Indeed, as
we see from the figure S may remain unchanged for small enough values of
c, depending on the attack scenario. This is different from the node-targeted
attacks, where the removal of a node decreases the size of S at least by the
relative share of this node. In this respect, the most particular behavior is
observed for the highest link degree scenario (red curves in Fig. 4). The value
of S first remains practically unchanged (up to a concentration of removed
links c ∼ 0.08 for London PTN and even c ∼ 0.36 for Paris PTN) and then
abruptly decreases almost to zero. This behavior however is an artifact of the
recalculated link degree scenario: after removal of the top 1% of links linked
to highest degree nodes these nodes may remain connected and will in general
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Fig. 4 Relative size of the largest component of the Paris and London PTNs for different
link attack scenarios. RL: random removal of a link, k(e), CB(e): highest link degree and
highest link betweenness scenarios. Here, the links (not the nodes) are removed. Hence, c
denotes the share of removed links. As in Fig. 2, a letter in square brackets refer to the
London [L] or Paris [P] PTN.
not be targeted in the next step after recalculation. Therefore many steps are
needed to strip these nodes off all their links. To further quantify the impact
of different scenarios we have calculated the value of the resilience measure A,
introduced in the previous section, see Eq. (8). We present the results for all
three scenarios in Table 2. As shown in the table, almost for all link-targeted
scenarios the values of A is almost twice as large for the Paris PTN in com-
parison with the London PTN. Another obvious observation is that different
scenarios applied to the same PTN lead to similar values of A. Returning
back to Fig. 4 it is obvious that not only the resilience measure A but also
the S(c) curves demonstrate very similar behavior following both random and
link betweenness scenarios.
Based on the above simulated attack scenarios we observe that under al-
most all of these the London PTN appears to be more vulnerable than the
Paris PTN. One may therefore ask if there are a-priory criteria that may in-
dicate network resilience prior to any (simulated) attack. In former analysis
[13,20] we found, that a useful criterion for resilience of PTNs with respect to
link-targeted attacks is the mean node degree 〈k〉 of the unperturbed network.
Typically, networks with a higher mean node degree are more resilient. Fur-
thermore, in a recent study on the link-targeted resilience of fourteen different
PTNs of major cities [13,20], the resilience measure A was found to almost lin-
early increase with 〈k〉. This appears to indicate that network (link) resilience
depends primarily on the initial ’density’ of network links, almost independent
of possible correlations within the PTN structure. To some extent this is dif-
ferent to the criteria discussed in the former subsection for the node-targeted
attacks, where the correlations were considered involving the second moment
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of the node degree distribution 〈k2〉 that enters the Molloy-Reed parameters
(9), (11). Comparing 〈k〉 for the two unperturbed PTNs (table 1) one can see
that its value for Paris PTN exceeds that for London PTN almost in 1.4 times
(2.60 for London and 3.73 for Paris, see the table). This observation may be
taken as an indicator for a correspondingly higher resilience of the Paris PTN.
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Fig. 5 a: A graph with three routes, each shown in a separate color; b: the corresponding
bipartite graph - route nodes are depicted as square boxes; c: the weeded graph without
dangling station nodes.
5 One step further: Cascading effects
The approaches to network attack as described in the previous sections assume
that any attack on a given station will in first place affect the attacked station
and the links to its direct neighbors within the network. The operation of all
traffic on the transit network is in this view unaffected on all other links and
nodes within the network. This implies some non-realistic situations: e.g. if a
subway station X on the London tube ceases to function the model assumes
that all routes that would otherwise pass through that station will be split
into two halves that continue to function as normal on the remaining parts of
that route. Obviously this will in general not happen and instead the route as
a whole will cease to operate or at least be seriously reduced in its function.
We therefore embark in this final section to explore the impact of attacks
on the network including the cascading effects on all routes that service the
attacked station in assuming that all routes that service that station will cease
to operate.
This task may be considerably simplified by re-interpreting the network
in terms of a so-called bipartite graph. The procedure is illustrated in Fig. 5.
Every route is represented by a square vertex connected to the nodes of all
its stations, see 5a,b. In a further simplifying step we weed out all stations
that are connected to a single route only, as they do not contribute to the
connectivity of the network, see 5c.
Within this bipartite network we identify the station node with highest
betweenness following the same procedure as above. That node and all adjacent
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Fig. 6 The break down of the connected component of the London (light yellow) and
Paris (dark blue) PTN under cascading effects, see the text for the attack scenario. For
each step of the attack we depict the corresponding station with highest betweenness that
is subsequently removed. The axis on the left indicates the remaining percentage of the
connected part of the network.
routes are then removed - as will all station nodes that become disconnected
in this process.
The latter step is repeated until the largest connected component in the
remaining network is smaller than half of the original bipartite graph indicating
complete breakdown of the network.
Following this procedure we find that both the Paris and the London net-
work reach the 50% breakdown point when only 0.47% of the total stations
become dysfunctional. This corresponds to 34 stations of the London PTN
and 19 stations of the Paris network. Fig. 6 depicts the break down of the con-
nected component of the network. For each step of the procedure we depict the
corresponding station with highest betweenness that is subsequently removed.
The axis on the left indicates the remaining percentage of the connected part
of the network. We close by noting that on an operational basis the network
may break down even much earlier, than predicted by our theory as far as
the load to be transferred to the remaining routes will far exceed by far the
capacity of these at an even lower number of dysfunctional routes.
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